↑ Gehrlein, William V.; Valognes, Fabrice (2001). "Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference". Social Choice and Welfare. 18: 193–205. doi:10.1007/s003550000071. S2CID10493112. The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections.
↑ Gehrlein, William V.; Fishburn, Peter C. (1976). "Condorcet's Paradox and Anonymous Preference Profiles". Public Choice. 26: 1–18. doi:10.1007/BF01725789. JSTOR30022874?seq=1. S2CID153482816. Condorcet's paradox [6] of simple majority voting occurs in a voting situation [...] if for every alternative there is a second alternative which more voters prefer to the first alternative than conversely.
↑ McLean, Iain; Urken, Arnold B. (1992). "Did Jefferson or Madison understand Condorcet's theory of social choice?". Public Choice. 73 (4): 445–457. doi:10.1007/BF01789561. S2CID145167169. Binary procedures of the Jefferson/Robert variety will select the Condorcet winner if one exists
↑ Gehrlein, William V. (2011). Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules. Lepelley, Dominique. Berlin: Springer. ISBN9783642031076. OCLC695387286. empirical studies ... indicate that some of the most common paradoxes are relatively unlikely to be observed in actual elections. ... it is easily concluded that Condorcet’s Paradox should very rarely be observed in any real elections on a small number of candidates with large electorates, as long as voters’ preferences reflect any reasonable degree of group mutual coherence
↑ Darlington, Richard B. (2018). "Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?". arΧiv:1807.01366 [physics.soc-ph]. "CC [Condorcet] systems typically allow tied ranks. If a voter fails to rank a candidate, they are typically presumed to rank them below anyone whom they did rank explicitly.".
↑ Hazewinkel, Michiel (2007-11-23). Encyclopaedia of Mathematics, Supplement III (ภาษาอังกฤษ). Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN978-0-306-48373-8. Briefly, one can say candidate A defeats candidate B if a majority of the voters prefer A to B. With only two candidates [...] barring ties [...] one of the two candidates will defeat the other.
↑ Nurmi, Hannu (2012), "On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice", ใน Felsenthal, Dan S.; Machover, Moshé (บ.ก.), Electoral Systems, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 255–274, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_10, ISBN9783642204401, S2CID12562825
