↑ Article 25 of The San Francisco Peace Treaty defines the Allied Forces as "the States at war with Japan, […] provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. […] the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined." The Allied powers were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty.
↑ Northern Territories dispute highlights flawed diplomacy. By Gregory Clark. Japan Times, March 24, 2005. "Japanese materials at the time – Foreign Ministry maps, statements by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida at San Francisco and in his later memoirs, and newspaper reports all make it clear that Etorofu and Kunashiri were most definitely included. The chief U.S. negotiator for the San Francisco treaty, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, agreed. Asked at San Francisco to define the territory of the Kurils, he said only that the Habomais might be excluded (at the time there were suggestions that Shikotan might be part of the Kurils). More was to follow. Questioned in the Diet on October 19, 1951, over whether the word "Kurils" as used in the treaty included Etorofu and Kunashiri, the head of the Foreign Ministry Treaties Bureau, Kumao Nishimura, said unambiguously that both the northern Chishima and southern Chishima (Etorofu and Kunashiri) were included."
↑ James D. J. Brown (2016). Japan, Russia and their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion. Routledge. p. 1. In 1956, on the occasion of the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations, Moscow officially stated that it was willing to transfer the two smaller islands to Japan following the conclusion of a peace treaty. As confirmed by Vladimir Putin in 2000 and again in 2012, this remains Moscow's position (Soejima and Komaki 2012). Japanese leaders, however, have consistently refused to accept this offer, drawing attention to the fact that Shikotan and Habomai represent only 7 percent of the disputed territory (Prime Minister Noda cited in Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2012). Despite the passage of much time and considerable diplomatic effort, the sides have essentially been unable to proceed beyond this impasse.
