↑ Oren 2002/2003, p. 312; Burrowes & Douglas 1972, pp. 224–25
↑ Shemesh, Moshe (2007). Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957–1967. Sussex Academic Press. p. 118. ISBN978-1-84519-188-7. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ 27 October 2015. The Jordanian leadership's appraisal of the repercussions of the Samu' raid was a major factor in King Husayn's decision to join Nasir's war chariot by signing a joint defense pact with Egypt on May 30, 1967. This was the determining factor for Jordan's participation in the war that would soon break out.... Convinced after the Samu' raid that Israel's strategic goal was the West Bank, Husayn allied himself to Nasir out of a genuine fear that, in a comprehensive war, Israel would invade the West Bank whether or not Jordan was an active participant. Unknown parameter |dead-url= ignored (help)
↑ Tessler, Mark (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. John Wiley & Sons. p. 378. ISBN978-0-253-20873-6. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. สืบค้นเมื่อ 27 October 2015. Towards the War of June 1967: Growing tensions in the region were clearly visible long before Israel's November attack on Samu and two other West Bank towns. An escalating spiral of raid and retaliation had already been set in motion... Unknown parameter |dead-url= ignored (help)
↑ Morris, Benny (1999). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist–Arab Conflict, 1881–1998. Random House. p. 306. ISBN978-0-679-42120-7.
